Given the dangers of radioactive iodine and the effectiveness of KI in protecting large populations from this particular deadly toxin, why hasn’t our government already taken steps to stockpile the drug throughout the United States? The answer has nothing to do with doubts about KI or whether we are a nation at risk. There is near uniform agreement on both issues. The government’s failure can be traced to the tangled web among the nuclear power industry, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and the Bush Administration, all of whom were concerned that stockpiling KI might tarnish the public’s perception of nuclear power. It’s a position that is as ridiculous as it is deadly.
Who’s Responsible? The responsibility to regulate and assure the safety of America’s 104 commercial nuclear reactors rests in the hands of the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). What most people don’t know is that certain policies adopted by the NRC conflict with this responsibility.
Nuclear Safety: Nuclear power plants are not inherently safe. They are fundamentally complex machines that must be carefully operated to avoid a release of the radioactive materials they contain. Fortunately, American facilities are extremely well designed and layered with mechanical redundancies to prevent an escape of radiation. But, like any machine, these plants can break down or malfunction due to unanticipated circumstances, mechanical failure, or operator error. There is always a possibility that millions of Americans could be exposed to significant amounts of radiation. Proper planning, therefore, must involve more than “prevention.” It must also address the reality of a radiation release and provide the necessary strategies to mitigate the consequences.
Other Possible Risks – Terrorism, Hospitals: But an accident at a nuclear power plant is not the only potential source of risk. Exposure could also be caused by a terrorist attack at a facility. Moreover, risk is not confined to nuclear power plants. RAI exposure could be caused by terrorist use of a dirty bomb or the hijacking and detonation of nuclear material used for a variety of treatments in most American hospitals. Similarly, several leading universities now operate small reactors for research purposes. These often can be found in urban areas.
Lessons from History: The world has seen 3 large releases of radiation since 1945—the atomic bombings in Japan at the end of World War II, nuclear testing in the 1950’s, and the accident at Chernobyl in 1986. Extensive research on all three have led to the following findings about the spread of radiation and associated danger:
1. Radiation releases are not “local events.” Rather, they can spread dangerous levels of radioactive iodine (RAI) hundreds of miles downwind from the release point with the negative effects decreasing with distance. There is a need for protective measures for up to 200 miles from the release point.
2. Outside the immediate vicinity of a release, thyroid damage is the primary adverse health effect. Other harmful effects of radiation (besides thyroid damage), which may occur very near the release are difficult to detect beyond 10-miles. Consequently, protection of the thyroid for up to 200 miles is probably the most important step officials can take to mitigate the effects of a release in order to protect the largest segment of the exposed public.
3. Potassium iodide (KI) has been proven to be a safe and effective prophylactic measure to prevent thyroid damage caused by RAI. Its use for protection by anyone exposed to RAI is strongly endorsed by respected organizations in the US and worldwide.
NRC Strategy: The federal government’s primary strategic plan for the protection of the public can be found in an NRC document, NUREG-0654. While much of it is well thought-out, its failure to respond to the three points noted above could seriously endanger the public in a large-scale radiological emergency.
Inexplicably, the NRC has chosen to ignore their own finding that dangerous levels of RAI can be found beyond the current 10-mile EPZ (Emergency Protective Zone). As NUREG-0654 notes, “The choice of the size of the Emergency Planning Zones represents a judgment on the extent of detailed planning which must be performed…” – But surely, any judgment regarding the size of the EPZ should take into account the acknowledged fact that the danger exists for up to 200 miles.
According to the NRC, there only needs to be sufficient KI for workers at a nuclear facility and those individuals living within a 10 miles radius of the plant. The Commission identified 10 miles as the evacuation radius, also known as the “plume exposure pathway.” For those living within 50 miles of the facility or what the NRC calls the “ingestion exposure pathway,” the Agency decided that KI would not be required or necessary. Instead, the population will be evacuated and all exposed food and water will be destroyed.
No scientific explanation is given for this decision, or the apparent arbitrary reliance on distance. Instead, the authors of NUREG-0654 acknowledge that “protective actions would need to be taken outside the planning zones” (that is, beyond 10-miles). However, the document provides no directive to assure that planners have the resources to enable them to take the protective actions they acknowledge might be needed in a serious accident or release.
Congressional Reaction: Experts outside the NRC objected to the Commission’s findings and policy. As a result, in 2002, when Congress passed the Bioterrorism Act, specific language was included addressing the use of KI. Among other things, the law directed the President to create guidelines for stockpiling and distributing KI in the event of nuclear incident, and it directed the National Academy of Sciences to determine how best to implement this mandate.
In 2004, the Academy released its report, finding that KI “should be available to everyone at risk”, and that KI distribution programs should expand beyond ten miles to include “predistribution, local stockpiling outside the emergency planning zones (EPZ), and national stockpiles and distribution capacity.“
Nuclear Industry Pushes Back: Worried that the national stockpiling of KI could send a negative message about nuclear power, the NRC and the nuclear industry fought back. They appealed to President Bush, demanding that he ignore the scientific findings of the NAS. The President agreed and appointed an internal White House policy group to review the matter. Not surprisingly, this handpicked entity concluded that the safety of the American public could be assured in a nuclear emergency through mass evacuations, in-place “sheltering” (the opposite of evacuation), and efforts to find and destroy all RAI contaminated food and water. KI, they concluded, was unnecessary.
A Nation Unprepared: As a result, today, neither the Congressional mandate nor the findings of the National Academy of Sciences have been implemented. The amount of KI available today in the US is a small fraction of what might be needed in the event of a nuclear accident or nuclear terrorism. There are only about 15 million tablets for the (roughly) 4 million people living within 10 miles of US nuclear plants, and almost none for anyone else. Most large American cities, which would be likely targets for a terrorist attack, have little or no KI stockpiled. Millions of American at risk will have nothing.
Moreover, as Hurricane Katrina proved, evacuation of a city is extremely difficult and cumbersome. In addition, even if evacuation was practical, given that RAI is airborne, where would the population be sent? What about the protection of police, first responders and the National Guard troops who would have to stay onsite until the city was emptied?
For example, the Indian Point Nuclear Power Plant is less than 35 miles north of New York City. An accident or attack at the plant could expose the city’s population of 8.3 million and the approximately 19 million who live in the surrounding area. How would this many people be evacuated? Where would they be sent? How many emergency people would be required to effectuate an evacuation of this size? What steps would be necessary to protect food supplies and water?
Children Exposed: Today, no provision has been made to stockpile KI tablets at schools or day care facilities, leaving our country’s children, who are the most at risk from exposure to RAI, unprotected. Adequate initial supplies for the students and faculty at most schools would take up less room than a microwave.
Unfortunately, this is our nation’s policy. Protecting the reputation and image of the nuclear power industry has trumped protecting the public. It is a position that is as ridiculous as it is deadly. It must be changed.
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